Over the next two months, negotiators will grapple with difficult questions: whether Iran can continue enriching uranium, the fate of its stockpile, the intrusiveness of inspections, and the timing of sanctions relief. While technical compromises are possible, the political challenge is greater.

The Nuclear File: What Still Needs Negotiating?

The core issue is the future of Iran’s Iran uranium stockpile, a topic that has bedevilled negotiations for decades. A chasm has appeared between the sides, with US Vice President Vance telling US media that nuclear inspectors will be allowed back to help Iran “destroy the highly enriched stockpile.” Iranian officials, however, say negotiations on the programme will only begin after Friday’s signing, making no mention of inspectors or the uranium fate.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, an Iranian policymaker and former diplomat, noted that the hardest battle will be reconciling Iran’s insistence on peaceful enrichment with Washington’s demand for stringent restrictions. Ideally, the US would like Iran barred from enrichment for about 20 years, creating a wide gulf between positions.

Remaining negotiations will likely focus on enrichment levels, stockpile size and disposition, the fate of advanced centrifuges, and verification arrangements. These are highly complex issues that took years to negotiate under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Trump took the US out of in 2018.

Washington’s objective, said Mirkhan, is to limit Tehran’s nuclear capacities to a “genuinely civilian purpose.” Iran is believed to be harbouring about 440kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent. At the start of the war, the US demanded this stockpile be handed over, which Iran rejected, though it has at times appeared willing to discuss handing it to a third party or diluting it.

“The stockpile is central,” Mirkhan said. “As long as the enriched material and the infrastructure needed to process it remain inside the country and under Iranian control, Iran retains a threshold capability.”

Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, pointed to a possible middle ground: combining a moratorium with a low enrichment ceiling, a small stockpile, and intrusive monitoring. “The challenge is finding an arrangement Washington can call effective non-proliferation and Iran can present as preserving peaceful nuclear rights,” Vakil told Al Jazeera.

An Existential Issue

Another major obstacle is political. For the Islamic Republic, the nuclear programme is viewed as a strategic guarantee of the regime’s survival. The hard core of the regime has shown little indication that it is prepared to abandon that logic.

The debate over the Strait of Hormuz illustrates that the bigger challenge is sustaining the agreement. Iranian officials are presenting the commitment to reopen the strait as temporary, preserved under continued joint management with Oman. On paper, this is compliance; in practice, it preserves Iranian influence. Iran may start charging fees for services rendered to shipping, viewing the strait as both strategic leverage and a revenue source after years of sanctions.

Trust and the $24bn question also pose challenges. On Monday, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) claimed the agreement will provide Iran with $24bn of frozen assets during the 60-day negotiation period, with half to be paid before talks begin. The real battle may be over sequencing-who gives what first.

Geneva Summit Shapes Future Middle East Stability

The ceasefire deal marks the end of immediate hostilities, but the negotiations that matter have barely begun. Analysts warn that the next 60 days will determine whether the US-Iran relationship can transition from war to a sustainable framework. If the $24bn release and nuclear negotiations proceed smoothly, regional markets may stabilize further. However, if trust erodes over sequencing or inspection rights, the fragile peace could collapse, leading to renewed tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and renewed military threats in the region. The success of this initiative hinges entirely on the ability of both nations to bridge the wide political and technical gaps identified in these preliminary drafts.